The Foundations of Mao Zedong's Political Thought, 1917–1935 by Womack, Brantly

The Foundations of Mao
Zedong’s Political Thought
The Foundations of
Mao Zedong’s
Political Thought
1917–1935
BRANTLY WOMACK
The University Press of Hawaii ● Honolulu
Open Access edition funded by the National
Endowment for the Humanities / Andrew W.
Mellon Foundation Humanities Open Book
Program.
Licensed under the terms of Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 In-
ternational (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), which permits readers to freely
download and share the work in print or electronic format for
non-commercial purposes, so long as credit is given to the
author. Derivative works and commercial uses require per-
mission from the publisher. For details, see
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. The Cre-
ative Commons license described above does not apply to any
material that is separately copyrighted.
Open Access ISBNs:
9780824879204 (PDF)
9780824879211 (EPUB)
This version created: 17 May, 2019
Please visit www.hawaiiopen.org for more Open Access works
from University of Hawai‘i Press.
COPYRIGHT © 1982 BY THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF HAWAII
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
For Tang and Yi-chuang,
and Ann, David, and Sarah
Contents
Dedication                                                                             iv
Acknowledgments                                                                 vi
Introduction                                                                         vii
1 Mao before Marxism                                                        1
2 Mao, the Party, and the National Revolution:
1923–1927                                                                    32
3 Rural Revolution: 1927–1931                                        83
4 Governing the Chinese Soviet Republic: 1931–1934   143
5 The Foundations of Mao Zedong’s Political Thought  186
Notes                                                                                203
v
Acknowledgments
The most pleasant task of a scholar is acknowledging the
various sine quae non of one’s research. Two in particular stand
out. First, the guidance of Tang Tsou, who has been my mentor
since I began to study China at the University of Chicago. The
direction and quality of this research owe as much to him as
to me. Second, the very high quality of existing research con-
cerning Mao. Without Takeuchi Minoru’s Collected Works of
Mao Zedong the search for texts would have made my research
either incomplete or impossible. Just as importantly, the work
of Benjamin Schwartz, Stuart Schram, Jerome Chen, Frederic
Wakeman, and many others have created a starting point for
current studies which is already much higher than any single
scholar could attain on his own.
On the more personal level, the friendship and encourage-
ment of my colleagues have helped me persist in this project.
A number of friends were helpful specifically with this book:
Frederic Wakeman, Philip Lilienthal, John Starr, Peter Lee, Bob
Bradley, David Chu, Murray Leaf, William Liu, Ed Hammond,
Stuart Kiang, and Lowell Dittmer. It has been made more
readable by the editing of Don Yoder, and owes its index to
John Owens. The project was originally undertaken as a dis-
sertation, and it owes its initial encouragement, shaping, and
survival to Tang Tsou, Philip Kuhn, and Leonard Binder, who
composed the dissertation committee. The research has been
partially supported by the Center for Chinese Studies at the
University of California, Berkeley, and by a research grant from
the University of Texas at Dallas.
The sacrifices of Ann, David, and Sarah for the book are be-
yond recounting.
vi
Introduction
This study traces the development of Mao Zedong’s political
thought from his earliest writings to the beginning of the Long
March. It thus covers the first forty-two years of Mao’s life,
during which he participated in the May Fourth Movement of
1919, helped found the Chinese Communist Party, originated his
political-military strategy of base areas, and administered the
government of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi. Although
overshadowed by his later accomplishments, these experiences
and activities were of considerable importance in themselves,
and they were accompanied by writings which reflect Mao’s
judgment of their significance. The arguments, values, and
methods revealed in his writings helped shape Mao’s contribu-
tions to Chinese politics and are indeed themselves a significant
part of his contribution.
The purpose of the study is to draw upon the practical
nature of Mao’s writings and their political context in order
to produce an interpretation of his early political thought in
vivo. I attempt to present emerging political concepts with their
original referents and to discuss the subjects which Mao depicts
as urgent and important in terms of the practical decision points
he was facing as a political actor. This approach is particularly
well suited for Mao because his theoretical concepts tend to
emerge from a course of practical experience rather than an ab-
stract program. Mao’s explicit theorizing was a reflection of his
experience, and the gestation of his concepts in practice pro-
vided the referents and the connotative significance of his more
theoretical statements. This can be seen in the style of his the-
oretical discussions after 1949, in which he constantly refers to
his own experience and belittles any role which theory might
play apart from such practice. 1
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Attention to the unity of theory and practice is the basic
principle of Mao’s political thought, and I have argued else-
where that this is also a major innovation within both the
Chinese and the Marxist political traditions. 2 Thus the primary
task in understanding Mao’s thought is grasping its practical
context. The secondary tasks of logical interpolation and extrap-
olation, formulation of history of ideas, and comparison with
other thinkers depend on this type of in vivo interpretation. To
view Mao simply as a theoretician, or to abstract his theory from
his political life, not only runs a serious risk of distorting Mao’s
views by taking them out of context. It also presumes the incor-
rectness of one of Mao’s fundamental tenets—that theory and
practice are inseparably interwoven.
Mao’s theoretical development has never been simply an
explication of earlier convictions; developing experience and
shifting political contexts have led to continual recastings of
his thinking. Hence a study of any particular period of Mao’s
thought cannot be a survey of all the roots of all his thought; to
be comprehensive, therefore, this study would have to continue
to 9 September 1976. The reason this is not attempted here
is primarily practical: the development from alpha to omega of
Mao’s thought in its political context is too vast a subject. The
period covered in this study is the first of three major periods.
I call it the “foundations of Mao’s political thought” because it
was during this time that most of his important political con-
cepts germinated. His subordinate role in the party at this time
did not require Mao to make official, comprehensive pronounce-
ments, but his practical political tasks induced the development
and confirmation of a distinctive epistemology, political thought,
and political style.
In the next major period, 1936–1940, Mao’s new responsibil-
ities of general leadership required him to state his views
authoritatively. Mao’s confidence in his own correctness vis-à-
vis the Stalinist ideologues in the Comintern and the party was
greatly strengthened by the lessons of the Chinese Soviet Re-
public in Jiangxi, but the transformed political context of the
Anti-Japanese War required an abstraction of his political prin-
ciples from their practical roots. The results of this abstraction
and reapplication are Mao’s theoretical works of the late 1930s
(“On Practice” and “On Contradiction” are the best known) and
his strategic analyses of the war and the Second United Front
with the Kuomintang. As the war persisted, the rectification
of the party and the political economy of the communist-con-
trolled areas required new authoritative statements on matters
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of revolutionary administration. Most of these statements also
have clear precedents in the “foundations” period. Finally, in
the civil war the accumulated revolutionary experience and mil-
itary power were applied to the task of final victory in China.
The third period is that of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). This stage is first characterized by Mao’s relinquishing
of active direction of the revolution (for instance, the estab-
lishment of “first and second” lines of leadership in the Central
Committee). Mao had stepped down because of his assumption
that the new postliberation stage would be radically different
from his accumulated experience and because of his desire to
continue the vitality of the revolution by allowing other leaders
to develop their experience. But certain problems of the new
China turned out to be quite similar to those of Mao’s ex-
perience, and other truly novel problems were presented by
the leadership to which he had entrusted the management of
China. These developments led Mao to reintroduce the politics
of revolutionary struggle (the Great Leap Forward and, most im-
portant, the Cultural Revolution) but with far more complex re-
sults than in the original struggle for liberation. Whereas Mao’s
leadership before 1949 prevailed because of the timeliness of
his politics, his two major interventions into the politics of the
PRC were of a different sort. The “revolutionary romanticism” of
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution involved
a distinctive opposition of revolutionary will and the processes
of history. The experiential foundations of Mao’s values and
policies are evident, but to a great extent they are the retro-
spective experiences of Yanan and Jiangxi attempting to pre-
serve, shape, and push onward a revolutionary present. Mao’s
lifelong concern for the survival of the revolutionary movement
shifted away from the pre-1949 problem of physical survival to
the more difficult ethical and political ones of preserving revo-
lutionary identity.
The “Gang of Four” brought the self-destructive tendencies
of unlimited moral critique to a fever pitch and thereby
contributed greatly to the ease of their own removal. Since
the main ideological strength of the Gang of Four lay in their
single-minded extrapolation of Mao’s revolutionary values as
expressed in the Cultural Revolution, Hua Guofeng has since
emphasized the concern with socialist construction which was
prominent in Mao’s writings in the 1950s and Deng Xiaoping
has emphasized the practicality of Mao’s thought in order to
provide a thread of continuity into the post-Mao era. But there
is no easy solution to the political and ethical challenges of
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Mao’s legacy, and the multistage movement to criticize the
Gang of Four is testimony to this. The fruit of Mao’s practical
revolutionary efforts was the contradiction of a revolution in
command. The struggle with this contradiction will continue.
It is my expectation that the basic values of Mao’s politics,
formed in his early activities, will prove to be a durable
contribution to Chinese politics. Before Mao’s death, such an
expectation would have been considered too obvious to deserve
mention, but the public criticism of Mao and the large-scale
repudiation of his policies which have been increasing since
1978 require an investigation into the limits of “De-Maoization”
and the prospects of his basic approach to politics. Briefly, I
would argue that the foundations of Mao’s politics have already
been incorporated into China’s political culture. During his last
twenty years, however, Mao applied these principles in an egal-
itarian critique based on class struggle, and the current lead-
ership repudiates this approach in favor of the more stable
development of the “four modernizations.” Reversing twenty
years of Chinese politics creates a major political watershed at
the expense of Mao, but his basic approach to politics remains
influential even in the new era of post-Mao modernization.
In terms of political power, Mao did not pass from the scene
until almost two years after his death. Until mid-1978, the
legacy of Mao’s political preferences and aversions was still
a significant factor—although no longer a decisive one—in
Chinese policymaking. The key effort of Vice-Premier Deng Xi-
aoping’s forces in 1978 was to break decisively the inertia of
policies identified with Mao as a result of his personal, radical
interventions in Chinese politics from 1958 until his death. 3 Two
related theses were essential to the effort: first, that China had
entered a new period in which practical commitment to modern-
ization determined the course of politics; second, that practice
was basic to Mao’s system of thought, and policy should be
determined by practical considerations rather than dogma. To-
gether these theses implied that China should rethink her pol-
itics on the basis of the practical needs of the new age and
that those scandalized by the abandonment of Mao’s policies
were still suffering from the poison of Gang of Four dogmatism.
4 In short, yesterday’s Maoism was today’s anti-Maoism, and
yesterday’s “capitalist roaders” were rehabilitated as victims of
dogmatist persecution.
The rollback of the Cultural Revolution was interpreted as
a rejection of Mao because its radical policies had prevailed
through his personal intervention and the ensuing chaos had
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been contained and legitimated by an unprecedented glorifi-
cation of his wisdom and power. The policies of Mao which
emerged in his last ten years had as their target the power and
political predilections of China’s intermediate leadership. Now
the former victims were asserting the legitimacy of their privi-
leges and the autonomy of their responsibilities.
On the other hand, Deng Xiaoping in his major speech on the
subject made an excellent argument for the primacy of practice
in Mao’s thought, 5 and the research of this book supports his
contention. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping’s political style is closer
to Mao’s preliberation style than was that of the Gang of Four.
Many of the current attempts to further material well-being
and to increase popular control over officials—and the rationale
behind these policies 6 —have precedents in Mao’s base area ac-
tivities.
To the extent that the political thought of Mao Zedong can
be identified with the radical policies which succeeded because
of his personal espousal and the superhuman image of the Great
Helmsman, the reorientation of 1978 marked an attack on his
influence. Since Mao in fact had been so identified during his
last ten years, both within China and outside, the assumption
is natural that the current phase is a complete displacement
of Mao. From a longer historical perspective, however, the
weakness of this assumption and the limits of the identification
upon which it is based become apparent. Deng Xiaoping has re-
turned to pre-Cultural Revolution (and in some cases pre-1957)
positions, but he could not return to a pre-Mao position. Mao’s
preeminent contribution to Chinese history was his guidance of
the Chinese revolution. The lengthy process of this revolution
was also the process of creating the structures, values, and
leadership cadre of the People’s Republic of China. A Hong
Kong supporter of the current changes expressed the rela-
tionship to Mao eloquently:
Mao Zedong’s thought is a spiritual treasure of the Chinese
people; for years it has melded with the people and no one can
reject it. The people can’t reject it because they cannot reject
their own revolutionary past. They cannot throw aside the weapon
with which they know and change the world…. Mao Zedong made
mistakes, but the demand that the party completely and accu-
rately grasp Mao’s thought [the official formula under which
his mistakes are analyzed] should not be regarded as a remon-
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strance against Mao Zedong the individual. It is self-examination
(fanqing) by the Chinese people, their self-criticism and their self-
evaluation. 7
As a constitutive rather than a controversial contribution,
Mao’s preliberation politics forms the accepted framework of
assumptions for Chinese Communist politics. The common
ground and its origin are not called to the attention of the
foreign observer, but if one does not devote special efforts to
grasp it, the changes in Chinese politics must appear unintel-
ligible. The Cultural Revolution was not a typical expression of
Mao’s politics. It was an extreme effort by Mao, using novel
means, to correct what he perceived to be the drift of party
leadership away from revolutionary ideals. 8 The leadership
could not defend itself from this charge because Mao’s consti-
tutive role in the party, the revolution, and its ideology made
his authority unimpeachable. The post-Mao rejection of the ex-
cesses of the Cultural Revolution is complicated not only by the
fact of Mao’s leadership of it but by the general desire to retain
and reestablish continuity with the party’s revolutionary past.
Because such a distinction between Mao’s constitutive role
in Chinese Communist politics and his specific political
interventions since 1957 has been lacking in most under-
standings of Mao, his politics is assumed to be irrelevant
(except as a target) to current Chinese politics, and hence un-
interesting. The contrast with the attention to Mao of a few
years ago is enormous, but, as the Chinese say, the periods
have changed. For our purposes, however, it is worth reviewing
the assumptions of Cultural Revolution studies of Mao. The ten-
dency to replace the study of a whole communist polity with
a study of its leader made an intensive study of Mao during
his lifetime too easy to justify. This approach to Mao has been
discarded rather than criticized; hence its assumptions tend to
reappear—with much weaker grounding—in the analysis of the
current Chinese leadership.
The cultural ideal of the Promethean revolutionary has pro-
vided a satisfying—but false—interpretive model for Mao’s life.
There are two equally basic errors in the presumption of this
subjectivistic image. First, Mao’s determination of purpose was
at least as dependent on objective factors as it was on subjective
preference. He aimed at correct action—the apt solution for
the particular problem—rather than the implementation of a
private notion of the good. The epigram of a German theorist-
politician that “politics is the art of making necessity possible”
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is apt for Mao’s approach. 9 Second, Mao’s method of lead-
ership—through practical models rather than through theo-
retical treatises, through struggle rather than through harmony,
through collective action rather than through authoritative
command—committed him to a process in which individual pref-
erences were risked in the attempt to induce a communal
movement. In what he pursued and how he pursued it, Mao was
not merely an individual in relation to history: he was one im-
mersed in history through a self-conscious dialectic of subject
and object.
If Mao’s presence in Chinese politics is grasped as a his-
torical dialectic, one runs less risk of exaggerating Mao’s in-
fluence in the study of China. Concentrating attention on the
masses is also an eminently Maoist adjuration: “Comrades!
What is a true bastion of iron? It is the masses, the millions
upon millions of people who genuinely and sincerely support the
revolution, that is the real bastion which no force can smash,
no force whatsoever.” 10 The resulting revolution is a collective
accomplishment, and Mao makes his own role in it clear in
his criticism of Lin Biao’s “theory of genius”—the tendency to
attribute all accomplishments to the power of Mao’s thought
which became prominent in the Cultural Revolution:
It is not that I do not want to talk about genius. To be a genius is
to be a bit more intelligent. But genius does not depend on one
person or few people. It depends on a party, the party which is
the vanguard of the proletariat. Genius is dependent on the mass
line, on collective wisdom. 11
Mao’s preference for collective wisdom is shown even in the
writing of his critique of the genius theory: “I wrote ‘Some
Opinion,’ which specifically criticizes the genius theory, only
after looking up some people to talk with them, and after some
investigation and research.” 12
Mao’s dependence upon colleagues and ultimately upon the
masses clearly does not imply passivity on his part. The in-
fluence of colleagues occurred within the framework of pro-
moting revolutionary tasks; the influence of the masses oc-
curred within the process of popular mobilization. Despite the
impression given by later canonizations of his thought, Mao’s
typical argument relies not on the intellectual appeal of a bril-
liant idea but on the urgency and practicality of a specific
measure for popular mobilization. It is particularly clear in his
earlier writings that a great deal of the quality of Mao’s political
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thought comes from lessons from the masses gained in the
processes of investigation and mobilization. It is also evident
from Mao’s conflicts with party leadership before 1935 that the
process often mistakenly individualized as a power struggle be-
tween Mao and the “Twenty-eight Bolsheviks” who controlled
the CCP from 1931 to 1935 was more importantly a process of a
new political style emerging collectively (with Mao as its chief
exponent) from the experience of revolutionary government in
Jiangxi.
Mao’s active reliance on colleagues, the masses, and
changes in the objective political situation allows the study of
his political thought to be more than biographical delving into
the personal idiosyncrasies and brilliance of a leader. Such in-
terdependence makes the popular question of Mao’s individual
innovations within Chinese political thought, Marxism, or social
science both less significant and much more difficult to answer.
By concentrating on Mao, this study inevitably gives a mis-
leading emphasis both to his role in the events discussed and
to his originality in politics. But if the problem of who holds the
copyright on a particular idea is left aside, Mao’s writings an-
alyzed in context become a fascinating window to the politics
and thinking of his China. Not only did the significance of Mao’s
China and his own personal weight within that sphere increase
enormously, but his writings became the core of the official ide-
ology—the orthodox definition of the meaning of the revolution.
Thus the attempt to acquire an intimate understanding of the
dialectical development of Mao’s politics and thinking is also an
approach to the roots of contemporary China’s most prevalent
self-understanding.
Introduction
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1 Mao before Marxism
Considering the small quantity of Mao’s writings prior to his
identification with the Chinese Communist Party and the rel-
ative insignificance of his precommunist political activities, the
“early Mao” has received an unusual amount of attention from
both Western scholars and Chinese biographers.
The three most prominent Western scholars who base their
interpretations of Mao on circumstances or writings of this
period differ widely in what they consider significant. Richard
Solomon’s psychological interpretation stresses biographical
and autobiographical accounts of Mao’s struggles with his
father to indicate the root of a basic urge to struggle against au-
thority. 1 Mao’s revolution is thus the collision of this urge with a
traditionally docile political culture. Frederic Wakeman’s wide-
ranging study History and Will attempts to establish the signif-
icance of Mao’s thought by coordinating a presentation of the
Chinese and Western thinkers who influenced Mao’s intellectual
development. 2 Certainly Mao has stated that he read and was
influenced by these thinkers in his youth. 3 But Wakeman’s in-
tellectual historical approach and Solomon’s psychological per-
spective both presuppose that the continuity between Mao’s
youth and his maturity is more important than any discontinuity
or development. Stuart Schram, the major translator of Mao’s
pre-Marxist works into Western languages, has proposed the
more complicated thesis that the ideas presented in Mao’s early
works submerge during his Marxist period (1922–1965) and
surface again with the Cultural Revolution. 4 The truly Maoist
periods in this view are youth and old age, when his own ideas
were not subservient to Marxist ideology.
Chinese interest in Mao’s early life has produced two very
useful biographies, Xiao San’s Comrade Mao Zedong’s Boyhood
and Youth and Li Rui’s Comrade Mao Zedong’s Early Revolution
ary Activities. These are supplemented by a number of historical
1
articles and reminiscences including a 1979 essay by Li Rui
entitled “The Ideological Trend of Mao Zedong in His Youth.”
5 The period as a whole is viewed by these writers as the time
when Mao’s characteristic intellectual and political habits took
shape. Hence their position is more similar to Wakeman’s view
than to Solomon’s reductionist interpretation or to Schram’s
discontinuity thesis. Their emphasis, however, is more on Mao’s
political development than on the significance of his intellectual
encounters.
From Mao’s own epistemological standpoint, one would ex-
pect him to consider youthful experiences important but not
determining, and indeed that seems to be the tone of his well-
told autobiographical account. The conditions under which con-
sciousness arises are of primary importance to a materialist.
But for Mao this primacy has significance only in action, and
his practical orientation is grounded in the conviction that any
condition can eventually be overcome through persistent effort.
Thus the dialectic between subjective and objective renders ab-
stract statements concerning the priority of one or the other
(“determinism” or “voluntarism”) virtually meaningless. In one
of his earliest preserved remarks, Mao writes:
Although I am determined by Nature, I am also at the same time
a part of Nature. Accordingly Nature can determine my strength,
and I also can determine Nature’s strength. Although my strength
is small, it cannot be said that it is without influence on Nature. 6
Our focus in this chapter will be primarily on Mao’s pre-
Marxist writings, because a careful reading of these works
yields valuable information about Mao’s intellectual and po-
litical starting point. But we will begin with a brief look at the
context of Mao’s childhood and youth, since Mao’s energetic in-
volvement with family and school provided a striking source and
corollary to his theoretical and political disposition.
THE CONTEXT OF MAO’S YOUTH
Although many other revolutionaries came from pleasant
family situations, in Mao’s case life at home was analogous
in many respects to the society he was later to revolutionize.
From his father he learned power, exploitation, and hatred;
from his mother he learned compassion and love. It should be
1 Mao before Marxism
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noted, however, that Mao’s father was a “teacher by negative
example”: Mao’s frontal and energetic opposition was a mirror
image of his father’s strongest trait, while the possibilities of al-
ternatives were shown by his mother. Significant for his later
activities outside the family, he learned that paternal authority
could be successfully opposed. This victory in the struggle for
recognition with his father was won by exploits of unusual
courage which must have contributed greatly to Mao’s early de-
velopment of an independent and vigorous character. 7
Two other aspects of Mao’s family situation may have influ-
enced his later behavior: its economic activities and its financial
support for his studies. From an early age Mao imitated his
mother’s benevolence in dealing with needy people, 8 and he
must have been disturbed by his father’s callousness in ex-
panding the family fortune. 9 Economic success came too late to
spare Mao from a childhood of hard physical labor, but it did
enable his family to provide the modicum of support which al-
lowed him to pursue his studies. Mao’s first acts of opposition to
academic masters began at the same time as his disobedience
to his father. Indeed, running away from school at the age of
ten is the first act of protest Mao recalls, and it brought better
treatment from both teacher and father. “The result of this act
of protest impressed me very much. It was a successful ‘strike.’”
10 Although he resented having to memorize the classics, he
learned to deploy them to his advantage in arguments with his
father.
Mao entered the environment of the large “modern schools”
at the age of sixteen, and with a two-year interruption for army
service and independent study, he continued his studies until he
graduated from the Hunan First Normal School in 1918 at age
twenty-four. Mao’s experiences during this period were much
more than merely a confirmation of habits developed within the
family. They were a socialization into the turbulence of modern
China which took place as a characteristically energetic di-
alectic between himself and his school environments.
Mao’s most notable conflicts during his scholastic career
were directly related to the structure and pedagogical assump-
tions of the modern schools. As Mao said in a later work in-
troducing a new kind of school system: “The general root of
the evil [of the modern schools] is causing the students to be
passive, grinding away character and tearing down the soul.
Timid ones become superficial followers of opinion and gifted
ones hesitate to come forward.” 11 The specific occasions for
student protest were matters like the large number of required
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courses, the prohibition of political activities, and the lack of an
adequate physical education program. Fortunately for Mao’s oc-
casionally threatened school career, some influential professors
and many students agreed with him and either defended him or
joined him. Without such peer support and approbation from re-
spected superiors, not only would his early efforts at reforming
his immediate society have met with complete failure, but he
would probably have found introspective pursuits more satis-
fying.
As Mao promoted various constructive, critical, and educa-
tional movements among his classmates (occasionally reaching
out to groups beyond—for instance, a night school for workers),
he developed personal ties which were to assure future support
for analogous activities under his leadership. This power to mo-
bilize was enhanced beyond mere numbers by the prestige of
students in general and by the reputation of the First Normal
School in particular, where Mao was evidently the preeminent
student leader. The high opinion which influential teachers like
Yang Changji had of Mao’s character and intelligence gave him
a foothold in the national academic world of China, although
the fracturing of this academic world by its politicization after
the May Fourth Movement—and the parochial character of his
arena—foreclosed the type of quick national fame made by
many in the Xin Qing nian (New Youth) generation.
Not the least contribution made by the modern schools to
Mao’s general development and political behavior was
educational: he acquired a deep acquaintance with Chinese
culture, the ability to express himself with finesse and power,
and a considerable knowledge of world affairs and history. His
tutoring in moral philosophy by Yang Changji was not only of
high quality but thoroughly in harmony with Mao’s habits of
independence, social concern, and action. Yang’s interest in
ethics and his syncretic method led him to emphasize the sim-
ilarity of Chinese and Western moral concerns, so that Mao’s
study of Western philosophy was not a disorienting con-
frontation with completely alien ideas. Mao’s attitude toward
the Chinese classics developed past his earlier use of them
as cultural weapons against his father. Both Mao’s autobiog-
raphy and his later writings indicate the breadth of ancient
and modern intellectual influences which he absorbed during
his school days in Changsha. 12 Yang Changji’s emphasis on the
harmony rather than the disparity of East and West undoubtedly
contributed to Mao’s later habit of using traditional Chinese ex-
amples to illustrate Marxist principles.
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The provincial, national, and international political environ-
ments of Mao’s youth were most influential in determining the
content of his political activity. Political literature of the times
introduced him to China’s national plight. Personal experience
of provincial affairs informed him about internal politics close at
home:
At this time [in 1906, when Mao was twelve] an incident occurred
in Hunan which influenced my whole life. Outside the little Chi-
nese school where I was studying, we students noticed many bean
merchants, coming back from Changsha. We asked them why they
were all leaving. They told us about a big uprising in the city.
There had been a severe famine that year, and in Changsha
thousands were without food. The starving sent a delegation
to the civil governor, to beg for relief, but he replied to them
haughtily, “Why haven’t you food? There is plenty in the city. I
always have enough.” When the people were told the governor’s
reply, they became very angry. They attacked the Manchu yamen,
cut down the flagpole, the symbol of office, and drove out the gov-
ernor. Following this, the Commissioner of Internal Affairs, a man
named Chang, came out on his horse and told the people that the
Government would take measures to help them. Chang evidently
was sincere in his promise, but the Emperor disliked him and ac-
cused him of having intimate connections with “the mob.” He was
removed. A new governor arrived, and at once ordered the arrest
of the leaders of the uprising. Many of them were beheaded and
their heads displayed on poles as a warning to future “rebels.”
This incident was discussed in my school for many days. It
made a deep impression on me. Most of the other students sympa-
thized with the “insurrectionists,” but only from an observer’s
point of view. They did not understand that it had any relation to
their own lives. They were merely interested in it as an exciting
incident. I never forgot it. I felt that there with the rebels were
ordinary people like my own family and I deeply resented the in-
justice of the treatment given to them. 13
The figures who won Mao’s sympathy were the rebels—common
people driven to extremes who fought heroically, though in the
end futilely, against the powers that were.
Upon entering school in Changsha Mao began his lifelong
habit of voracious newspaper reading. He thus became inti-
mately acquainted with the chaotic conditions of Chinese pol-
itics. 14 The republic which replaced the emperor quickly lapsed
into tragedy and then farce. The 1911 revolution ended imperial
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power by dissolving the political center; political unity would
not be completely restored to China until 1949. 15 The threat
of actual dissolution was serious, and foreign debts grew as-
tronomically. The sentence Mao remembered reading in 1910,
“Alas, China will be subjugated,” seemed just as appropriate
in 1919, when the results of the Versailles Peace Conference
induced the explosive growth of new antiimperialist forces in
China. Mao became an eloquent and powerful voice of anti-
warlord and antiimperialist sentiment in Hunan.
Because of its location, Hunan’s sufferings during this chaot-
ic period were especially acute. The struggles between northern
and southern powerholders crossed Hunan several times. More-
over, the economic boom caused by European preoccupation
with the First World War was over by 1917, and by 1919
provincial mining exports had declined to 1913 levels. 16 Mao’s
impassioned account of Hunan’s oppression by the rest of China
and his support of the Hunan self-government movement show
the provincial-patriotic direction of his early political thought.
17 Mao’s attitude toward Hunan was complex. He considered it
backward; its politics did not know of “thorough solutions based
on agreement, but only of private wars.” 18 But it was a province
with a glorious tradition of revolution and of revolutionary intel-
lectuals, particularly in recent times.
Despite his rural beginning, Mao quickly caught up with
the leading currents in Chinese progressive thought. Mao “wor-
shipped Kang Youwei and Liang Qiqiao” at the Tongshan Upper
Primary School. 19 At the Hunan First Normal School he became
an avid reader and later a contributor to the influential New
Culture Movement periodical Xin Qinqnian (New Youth), and in
the May Fourth Movement he became known for his political
and intellectual contributions to the Hunanese student
movement. To someone with this background, China seemed
young in thought, antiquated in institutions, and almost hope-
lessly adrift in politics.
MAO’S EARLY WORKS
Although Mao was an exceptional student and radical leader
during his years in Hunan, it is safe to say that had his activities
and writings ceased in 1923, when he was twenty-nine years
old, the surviving works of the period would not have received
widespread attention from Western scholars. This is not to say
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that they are (or were) insignificant in themselves, but that
much of their national and all of their international significance
depends essentially on the further career of their author. The
major utility of these early works in this respect is that they
help to establish Mao’s political identity before he became ex-
clusively involved in the affairs of the Chinese Communist Party.
A close analysis of Mao’s pre-Marxist or precommunist works
is essential for determining the effect of this change on his
thought.
Unfortunately for the purposes of periodization, neither
Mao’s political commitments nor his ideology were suddenly
transformed. If Mao could say as his good friend Cai Hesen did,
“Whatever my earlier thoughts, they are all mistaken and bad;
hereafter I will fly in pursuit of [Marxism],” 20 then neither the
dividing line nor its significance would be in doubt. But in Mao’s
case, “pre-Marxist,” “precommunist,” and “exclusive devotion
to party tasks” could all indicate different points in time. Mao’s
autobiography is cautiously worded: “By the summer of 1920 I
had become, in theory and to some extent in action, a Marxist,
and from this time I considered myself a Marxist.” Other com-
munist reminiscences prefer to quote this remark rather than
supply their own periodization. 21 Mao founded the Hunan nu-
cleus of the Chinese Communist Party early in 1921, and he at-
tended the First Party Congress in April of that year. But the
CCP in its first years was heterogeneous in both ideology and or-
ganization, 22 and Mao, as the founder and leader of the Hunan
provincial branch, was in a position to determine for himself
the practical significance of his commitments to communism.
Therefore I have shaped this chapter according to the conti-
nuity of Mao’s political activities and viewpoint rather than by
the date of his confessed allegiance to Marxism or the date of
the organization of the CCP. Mao continues to be engaged in
(and to write about) province-wide activities with a “populist”
rather than a class appeal until the fall of 1921, when orga-
nizing labor (the main effort of the CCP at this time) becomes
his preoccupation. Although Mao’s Marxist-oriented activities
started as early as the summer of 1920, for the following year
they coexist with more broadly based efforts. There are writings
by Mao in a three-volume anthology he edited in the early
twenties, Collected Correspondence of New Citizens Study So-
ciety Mem bers, 23 which would shed valuable light on this the-
oretical development, but unfortunately they are unavailable.
The available writings for 1920 and 1921 all concern his public,
political, and cultural activities in Hunan.
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The incompleteness of the corpus of Mao’s early works is
a considerable hindrance to comprehensive research on this
period. The editors of Mao’s Collected Works list the titles of
thirty-one works written before 1922 which are not available,
including one from 1919 entitled “What Is Socialism? What
Is Anarchism?” and articles on women’s rights and the labor
movement. Beyond these, the large number of school essays
and notebooks written by Mao during his five years at the
First Normal School would be extremely useful in specifying
the significance of various influences on his intellectual devel-
opment. Thus an analysis of what is available—some snippets
from various sources, six articles or series of articles, four ad-
vertisements—should not be mistaken for a complete picture of
Mao’s intellectual activity. But they are important works about
subjects important to Mao, and a close reading of them is not
likely to be misleading. The small number of writings makes it
possible to discuss the context and significance of each major
group of texts separately.
The earliest available texts by Mao are citations in Li Rui’s
biography from a 1914 notebook and from Mao’s extensive
marginal commentary on Cai Yuanpei’s translation of Friedrich
Paulsen’s System der Ethik. 24 Mao’s first published work was
“A Study of Physical Education” in New Youth, April 1917. 25
The next available complete works are announcements for the
first and second semesters of a night school for workers which
Mao organized in 1917. In the aftermath of the May Fourth
Movement Mao wrote many articles for journals which he
started. The “Opening Statement of the Xiang River Review” (14
July 1919) is a baptismal piece for one of his journals, 26 and
“The Great Union of the Popular Masses” is a series of three ar-
ticles published in the following three issues of the journal. 27
Mao’s involvement with specifically Hunanese political and cul-
tural endeavors is reflected in three items: first, four articles
and one coauthored manifesto on the Hunan self-government
movement of 1920; second, three articles on the founding and
early operations of the Cultural Book Society; and third, an
introductory statement on the Hunan Self-Education College
which Mao started in August 1921.
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QUOTATIONS FROM EARLY NOTES
The fragments which Li Rui provides from Mao’s earliest
notebooks are useless for the purpose of intensive analysis be-
cause they are short comments from unknown contexts. The
quotations from Mao’s marginal notes to Paulsen’s System of
Ethics are somewhat more useful because they are generally
enthusiastic comments on a known text. However, as Li re-
marks, these are casual notes determined by the flow of
Paulsen’s text. 28
Friedrich Paulsen was an influential German educator
around the turn of the century who also wrote vigorous and
popular works in philosophy and ethics. According to him the
task of philosophy is to build a “metaphysics from below” (Meta-
physik von unten) by synthesizing the results of the sciences
rather than meditating abstractly. The foundation and goal of
all philosophy is ethics, he argued, because will is primary to
intellect. This distinction is not a conflict, since in Paulsen’s
view the laws of nature are ethical and the laws of ethics
are natural. Since will is essentially the purposeful behavior
of the universe, there is no ultimate separation between sub-
jective and objective. Inclination and custom, individual will
and the will of the totality, tend by and large in the same di-
rection. 29 This ethical scientific world view was an assimilation
of Darwinism 30 and various aspects of philosophy into a well-
developed structure; it thus appealed to the progressive intel-
lectuals in China who were faced with their own mediation
between modern knowledge and a valuable ethical tradition.
Mao’s enthusiastic response to Paulsen’s System of Ethics
and the parallel between Paulsen’s views and Mao’s later
philosophy make a comparison of Paulsen and Mao tempting.
31 However, the comparison would necessarily imply an intel-
lectual connection for which there is insufficient evidence. A
Paulsenian essay which Mao wrote, “The Strength of the Will,”
and Mao’s copy of System of Ethics from which Li Rui quotes
would be essential to such a comparison. The quotations given
by Li are of course selected to demonstrate the continuity of
Mao’s thought, but it is noteworthy that since Li’s biography
was written in 1958 some of these continuities have continued
to develop. Mao’s youthful animus against those who consider
anything old as good and reject everything that is modern (shi
gu fei jin) 32 is reflected in later movements which “slight the
past and emphasize the present” (bo gu hou jin) and “use the
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past for the present and the foreign for China” (gu wei jin
yong yang wei zhong yong). His denunciation of the “four
demons”—religion, capitalism, monarchy, and the three bonds
(between prince and minister, father and son, husband and
wife)—is an enduring political stance, although the evil basis
of the four was later conceptualized as class oppression rather
than oppression of the individual. The interdependence of oppo-
sites is another theme which has an important role in Mao’s
later thought. Stuart Schram has pointed out parallels between
Mao’s 1959 dialectics and the following reflection on Paulsen:
I say: concept is reality, the limited is limitless, the sense of dura-
tion is transcendence of duration, imagination is thought, form
is essence, I am the universe, life is death, death is life, present
is the past and the future, past and future are present, small is
large, yang is yin, up is down, vile is pure, thick is thin. Speaking
of essences, the many are one, change is constancy. 33
This logic is directly related to Mao’s view of society in his
assertion that strength depends on resistance and in his re-
flection on the interdependence of natural determinism and free
will quoted at the beginning of this chapter.
“A STUDY OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION”
Contemporaneous with the two-year ethics course in which
he read Paulsen’s book, Mao became actively concerned with
the state of physical education at the First Normal School and
in China as a whole. At school this concern resulted in his
administration of an after-hours physical education program. 34
His general reflections on China’s needs in this regard led to his
first article, “A Study of Physical Education,” published in New
Youth in the spring of 1917. 35
The article challenges even the present-day reader with
statements like this:
Those whose bodies are delicate and small behave flippantly.
Those whose skin is flabby are soft and dull in will (Xin). This is
the effect of their bodies on their minds. 36
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The purpose of the article is to alert readers to the general
neglect and mismanagement of physical education in China and
to urge them, especially students, to begin effective exercise.
Although these two foci are respectively critical and hortatory,
the major part of the argument is constructive. The insufficiency
of contemporary efforts by physical educators is made evident
in a disquisition on the fundamental importance of physical ed-
ucation. The exhortation to exercise is given force and content
by an emphasis on the primacy of subjective consciousness in
improving the situation and by the provision of a program of ex-
ercise.
The study of physical education is important to the individu-
al because health is important; it is important to the nation be-
cause its weakness and lack of martial spirit stem from neglect
of physical training. A vigorous pursuit of virtue and learning
requires attention also to the balanced development of the body
through exercise. But physical development is more than the
presupposition of all other pursuits. The specific goal of physical
education from a social point of view is martial heroism, some-
thing sorely needed in China, and thus training which develops
strength of will and fierceness is especially recommended.
The article encourages the reader to proceed from under-
standing to action in order to improve an urgent situation. Mao
is merciless in confronting the reader with his obligation to start
exercising immediately. There is nothing more important, it is
never too late, any method will do, exercise enhances rather
than detracts from cerebral activities, neglect of exercise leads
to a short life, a weak will, and flippant behavior. The basic
theme is the primacy of self-awareness: “Strength (jianshi) lies
in exercise and exercise lies in self-awareness.” 37 The con-
sciousness emphasized here is not abstract potential or freedom
of choice, but the concrete ability (hence responsibility) to
proceed from correct understanding to successful action. Mao’s
thorough rejection of physical education programs concludes
not with an exhortation to change these programs but with a re-
minder that the main thing is the individual’s awareness of the
importance of physical education and his commitment to self-
improvement.
Mao’s emphasis on subjectivity as the solution to physical
development is balanced by an emphasis on practical results.
A hundred exercise programs may be propounded, but if “one
method or half a method” is sufficient, there is no need to
bother about the rest. Talk about physical education is not im-
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portant. What is important is actually doing it. Mao underlines
the practical orientation of the article by concluding with a full
set of exercises.
One striking characteristic of this article among Mao’s
works is its nonpolitical nature. Praise and blame are assigned
on the basis of people’s relationship to physical education
rather than to politics. Thus the martial sports of Japan and the
West are praised as well as robust figures of history: Yan Yuan,
Mohammed, Theodore Roosevelt, Gu Yanwu, Zeng Guofan.
Those berated most severely are the teachers and the educa-
tional system as a whole, both modern and traditional compo-
nents, and, by implication, the students for allowing the system
and group pressure to cause them to neglect their vital in-
terests.
Although the single-mindedness of the article precludes a
specific political viewpoint, the article does have political and
social implications and displays traits which underlie Mao’s
later political activities. Mao’s alternative ideas for education
were not presented until the founding of Hunan Self-Education
College in 1921, but his description of modern schools as detri-
mental to the physical well-being of students is a serious crit-
icism of his immediate social structure. Just as important,
however, is the theme of activism itself. “A Study of Physical
Education” is the first and most basic of Mao’s many efforts
to stir an audience to movement. To awaken communal self-
awareness and to develop communal strength and will through
practical activity are enduring themes of Mao’s social and po-
litical efforts. The potential attributed to conscious, disciplined
activity is infinite. No one is too old or too weak, no obstacle is
too great, for “the character of the body can change, the weak
can become strong, body and mind can both be complete—this
is not a matter of fate but is completely within human power.”
The metaphysical foundation of Mao’s confidence in the meta-
morphosing potential of action is given with double emphasis:
“There is only movement in heaven and earth.” 38 This rejection
of the immutability of the world, with its corollaries of the di-
alectical relativity of knowledge and the unlimited potential for
action, reappears in the well-known allegory “The Foolish Old
Man Who Removed the Mountains.” 39 The specific character of
this dialectical mode of exhortation can best be seen in contrast
to its nondialectical counterpart, “Do your best.” In the latter
formulation, moral justification is attained through maximum
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effort, but horizons of potential are accepted. Mao’s formulation
concentrates rather on the persistence of effort and its effec-
tiveness in transforming present limits.
THE WORKERS’ NIGHT SCHOOL
Mao’s work in physical education was only one of an aston-
ishing number of projects, political, educational, and even mili-
tary, 40 which he engaged in before the May Fourth Movement.
Originally most of Mao’s organizational talent was spent in stu-
dent affairs, although he also distributed leaflets against Yuan
Shi-kai and developed his political and social views. But as the
final year of school approached, Mao and his activist friends
began work in Changsha and founded the New Citizens Study
Society, “a society which was to have a widespread influence
on the affairs and destiny of China.” 41 The group had three
main purposes: the maintenance of selfless devotion to national
salvation; self-improvement through discussion, study, and ex-
ercise; and progressive community activities. Whereas Mao’s
vigorous support of student interests in the First Normal School
sometimes led to serious confrontations with school authorities,
the extracurricular activities of the New Citizens Study Society
were not disruptive. In this respect their activities were con-
siderably different from the antitraditional forays of the elitist
and protected colleagues of Zhang Guotao, who recalls from his
youth: “Thunderously we stormed temples, smashed images of
the gods, and campaigned against medical cures dispensed by
clay idols. Naturally we were in constant conflict with pious and
religiously faithful people.” 42
Typical and most demanding of Mao’s projects was the
Night School for Workers which was started in late 1917. The
registration announcements for the first two semesters of the
school provide short statements of its purpose and program.
43 Claiming that the workers’ greatest handicap was not being
able to read, write, and calculate, the students of the First
Normal School offered free courses at a time convenient to
workers. The enterprise involved considerable effort. There
were over 120 students, with classes meeting for two hours five
days a week, and Mao managed the school and taught history.
Another important activity of the New Citizens Study So-
ciety was encouraging Hunanese participation in the work-
study scheme for education in France organized in Peking by
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Wu Yuzhang and Cai Yuanpei. It was in connection with this
activity that Mao made his first trip outside of Hunan, during
which he stayed for several months in Peking working in the
library of Beijing University. Exposed to the leading edge of
Chinese intellectual and political progressivism, Mao became
more political and more radical. He returned to Changsha via
Confucius’ birthplace and Shanghai a few months before the
outbreak of the epochal May Fourth Movement in Peking in
1919.
OPENING STATEMENT OF THE XIANG RIVER
REVIEW
The effect of the May Fourth Movement on Changsha is de-
scribed in the opening paragraph of the Xiang River Review,
written two months after the beginning of the movement:
Since the call of “world revolution” and the onrushing movement
to “liberate mankind” antiquated outlooks must be changed. For-
merly we did not raise doubts on many problems, did not quickly
adopt many methods, and out of fear shrank from saying many
things. Now the undoubted is doubted, the unattempted is
attempted, many feared things are no longer feared. No matter
who the personage, he cannot escape its influence. 44
Mao Zedong, recent college graduate and just returned from a
stimulating trip to Peking, was a leader of one of the few activist
student groups in China antedating the May Fourth Movement.
He was thus in a preeminent position not only to experience but
to direct the impact of the May Fourth Movement in Hunan. The
significance of the May Fourth Movement cannot be reduced to
the anti-Japanese movement or to the New Culture Movement.
It served as a catalyst for a society which urgently needed a
new form of political expression and a new map for political
orientation. China, whose political life had traditionally been
controlled and centralized, was shattered into shifting zones of
power and mortally threatened by imperialism. Its social or-
dering, determined until the twentieth century by a centralized
and open examination system, now left university graduates
with an uncertain future. Lastly, the indomitable, unified, and
progressive West to which China had grown accustomed had
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torn itself apart in the war and was now frantically on the de-
fensive against new, even more progressive, popular forces epit-
omized by the Russian Revolution.
The founding of a newspaper was an appropriate May
Fourth activity. Not only was the awakening of large groups
of people to political action exciting and newsworthy but the
rapidity of the movement’s development led to optimistic
prognostications of political transformation. Mao’s Xiang River
Review, although it lasted only four weeks before it was shut
down by Hunan’s warlord, Zhang Jingyao, was a successful and
widely respected May Fourth publication. 45
The “Opening Statement of the Xiang River Review” (14 Ju-
ly 1919) is more a call to enlightenment than to action. As Mao
remarks elsewhere in the same issue:
Of China’s 400,000,000 people, approximately 390,000,000 are
superstitious. They blindly believe in ghosts, they blindly worship
unusual natural phenomena, they blindly believe in fate, they
blindly believe in coercion (qiang quan). They don’t recognize that
there are individuals, that there is a self, that there is truth. 46
His message is that hunger is the world’s greatest problem and
that the masses united have the greatest strength. Mao tries
to explain “how mankind should live.” He says that democracy
is the basis for all opposition to coercion. 47 The powers that
be in the sphere of religion, literature, politics, society, edu-
cation, economy, thought, and international politics must be
struck down by the call for democracy. Moderate methods are
preferred to violent methods, because the oppressors are also
prisoners of the old society and their abuse of power is an un-
conscious error. Besides this compassionate motive, Mao notes
that the end result of using coercion to strike down coercion is
still coercion.
Within his general preference for moderate methods, Mao
makes distinctions between different situations and the be-
havior appropriate to them. In the academic sphere he proposes
thorough research that is not bounded by tradition or super-
stition. In society he advocates unity of the masses to launch a
persistent movement to offer those in power “loyal advice” and
to achieve a “revolution by appeals.” This strategy is contrasted
to “revolution by bomb” and “bloody revolution,” which he feels
merely result in great confusion. To resist the immediate threat
of Japan, however, he suggests boycott of classes, suspension
of commercial activities, strikes against factories, and boycott
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of Japanese products as effective measures. This concern for
finding the appropriate methods for diverse social and political
circumstances finds its theoretical form in Mao’s later discourse
on the particularity of contradiction.
The themes of awakening, fearlessness, and confidence in
impending social transformation which pervade the article are
expressions of a faith in the power of the united masses stimu-
lated by popular ferment in China and the West. The May Fourth
Movement served as the catalyst for fusing Mao’s progressive
political sentiments and his inclination toward practical activity
into engagement in radical politics. Political engagement gave
Mao’s thinking a new starting point. From this time on, revo-
lution is the focus of his theory and practice.
The content of Mao’s May Fourth views is as interesting as
their new political engagement. The orientation is universal and
thorough: the call is “worldwide” to liberate “humanity,” and
the basic slogan is “achieve freedom from coercion.” 48 Paradox-
ically, Mao’s confidence in impending, thorough social transfor-
mation accounts for the moderate tactics he suggests. He does
not see the new society as a desperate undertaking, so violence
is not required. In fact, violence would taint the new order with
the methods of the old.
A link between this work and the Night School advertise-
ments is Mao’s presupposition of enlightenment as a prelude to
action. This attitude is best explained by an earlier comment on
Paulsen:
To say that knowledge has no impact at all on men’s hearts is
wrong; knowledge definitely has a great impact…. That mankind
has had progress, revolution, and the spirit of correcting faults
is completely due to activists (huodong zhe) who relied on the
leadership of new thought. 49
Although the dichotomies of teacher and taught, mover and
moved, enlightened and ignorant are not explicit in the Xiang
River Review, the overdrawn description of the backwardness of
Hunan and the nature of the newspaper’s project suggest that a
leading group is necessary to awaken the masses.
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“THE GREAT UNION OF THE POPULAR
MASSES”
The main political essay of the remaining three issues of the
Xiang River Review is the three-part article “The Great Union
of the Popular Masses,” which elaborates the idea of the power
of the unified masses into a general perspective on politics and
the Chinese and international political situations. The high rep-
utation of the Xiang River Review probably derives in large
part from this article, which was reprinted in full in Xingqiri
[Sunday], a Sichuan publication, and later was reprinted in
Shanghai. 50
The most striking stylistic characteristic of the piece is a re-
curring dialectical progression from extremely bad to extremely
good, and a related emphasis on the basic identity of diverse
phenomena. The fact that “the darkness of society has reached
an extreme,” internationally through the world war and na-
tionally through the North-South War, is the precondition to po-
litical transformation. “Thus there arises reform, there arises
resistance, therefore there is a great alliance of the masses of
the people.” 51 A similar transformation is expected for China.
Although she now seems completely incompetent in political
and economic affairs, in the future China will be preeminent
among nations. 52 As Mao observes in a later work, the theme
of transformation of opposites is both very Chinese and very
Marxist. Marx’s philosophical reason for suggesting the prole-
tariat as the ultimate revolutionary group is that they are so
oppressed that they are an anticlass rather than a part of bour-
geois society. 53 A similar confidence in the transformation of op-
posites leads Mao to welcome the observation (which otherwise
would be disquieting) that the principle of action he recom-
mends, the “great union,” has been the root source of power for
the nobles, the powerful, and the capitalists throughout history.
The technique of union, whose power comes from numbers, was
perfected by the few against the many. From the resulting com-
munity of weakness and misery arises the greatest union to de-
stroy its oppressors.
The “Great Union of the Popular Masses” is a theory of soci-
ety, a methodology for social transformation, and a judgment
of China’s readiness for transformation. In the first installment
Mao discusses the “possibility and necessity of the great union.”
The argument proceeds from the observation that “no matter
what the type of historical movements, there are none which do
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not proceed from the union of some people.” 54 He points out
that the power-holding minorities using the advantages of edu-
cation, money, and military strength have driven the masses of
people to such extremes that they have an intimate knowledge
of the methods of oppression and are becoming conscious of
the incomparably greater power of a mass union. Only a great
shout need be given, and the old society will crumble. In the
second installment, Mao presents the method of building up to
a great union by starting with groups of common interests. He
gives examples of the common interests of various basic groups
(farmers, workers, women, and the like) and suggests aggre-
gating these groups in general unions. The third installment
deals with China’s readiness for such a movement. Mao pre-
sents the situation realistically, demythologizing the 1911 rev-
olution but valuing the experience of provincial and county
assemblies and of course the organizations blossoming as a
result of the May Fourth Movement. He reasons that China’s
embarrassing performance in politics and economics is due to
lack of political experience stemming from long oppression. He
concludes that the very length and intensity of oppression will
lead to exceptionally rapid development:
Some day the reform of the Chinese people will be more thorough
than that of any other people. The society of the Chinese people
will be more glorious than that of any other people. The great
union of the Chinese people will be successfully completed before
that of any other place or nation. Gentlemen! Gentlemen! We
must exert ourselves together! We must strive forward together!
Our golden world (shijie), our glorious and bright world, is right
before us! 55
Mao’s political horizons are indistinct in this article. The
first part is dominated by a universal frame of reference and
a call to imitate countries, like Russia, more advanced in their
great unions. Since the second part deals primarily with small
unions it is locally oriented, with Changsha in mind, but the
suggestions apply to other localities. The last part deals with
China as a whole and is nationally oriented. As Stuart Schram
has pointed out, the article’s conclusion (which is quoted above)
is one of the most nationalistic passages in Mao’s writings. 56
However, it would certainly be mistaken to ignore the inter-
nationalist tone of the first installment and the “Introductory
Statement of the Xiang River Review,” since internationalism
constitutes an integral part of Mao’s argument. This seeming
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paradox of nationalism versus internationalism is partly ex-
plained by a difference in timing. For the present, China’s task
is to learn from countries which are more advanced in popular
struggles against power. China’s future transformation, once
accomplished, will be as glorious as her oppression was severe,
but this preeminence will exist in a transformed world order
and thus will not constitute hegemony among competitive na-
tions. Mao’s patriotism for China’s existing political order does
not extend beyond faith in China’s future and defensiveness vis-
à-vis foreign encroachments. In his proposals on Hunanese self-
government in the following year, Mao reviews the utter failure
of central government in China since 1911 and concludes, “The
best thing would be [for China] to split into twenty-seven coun-
tries (guo).” 57 Even this apparent provincialism is not as far
from Mao’s nationalism and internationalism as it would seem.
Mao’s reasoning leads him to this proposal through the prin-
ciple of self-determination, which he establishes with interna-
tional examples as a universal principle. Mao propounds this
self-determination of China’s subunits for the immediate good
of the Chinese people and expects them in the future to be re-
united in a single polity.
The deeper problem in categorizing Mao’s stance in regard
to national boundaries is that China’s national experience in
modern times has differed fundamentally from that of the West.
Western nationalism was at its most characteristic in the dis-
covery of collective cultural identities and the attempts to es-
tablish corresponding political entities. In some cases nation-
alism demanded the subdivision of culturally diverse empires;
in others it involved the amalgamation of culturally similar but
politically diverse polities. Western nations by and large defined
themselves against each other, seeking to distinguish separate
identity from a common heritage. China’s national experience
was instead a discovery of a world beyond herself. China found
herself defined by the forceful incursion of cultures she would
have preferred to ignore. In Kang Youwei’s Datong Shu [The
book of great harmony], China’s retreat from the presumed
universalism of her cultural significance to being one nation
among many is linked to a general dissolution of national bound-
aries and establishment of a world community. Mao seems to
share this self-confidence of cultural subsistence within a cos-
mopolitan framework, a position which cannot be described
simply as nationalist or internationalist.
A further problem in interpreting this article arises from the
following passage:
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As for the actions to be undertaken after the union [of the masses
has been achieved], there is one very radical faction which uses
the method of do unto others as they do unto you, and which does
its utmost to cause trouble for them [the capitalists and the aristo-
crats]. The leader of this faction is a German-born person named
Marx. The faction which is milder than Marx is not anxious to see
quick results and begins with the understanding of the common
people. All should have a morality of mutual aid and work volun-
tarily. If nobles and capitalists turn their hearts toward the good
and are capable of working, are capable of helping people and
not harming them, then they don’t have to be killed. The ideas of
this faction are more comprehensive, profound, and far-reaching.
They want to unify the world and make it one country, unify hu-
manity into one family, enjoy harmonious, happy, intimate, and
good relationships—not the type of intimate and close rela-
tionship suggested by Japan—and together achieve prosperity.
This faction’s leader is a Russian-born person named Kropotkin.
58
The question which of course arises from this passage is
whether Mao was an anarchist at this time—or at any rate more
of an anarchist than a Marxist. Mao relates in his autobiog-
raphy that he discussed anarchism during his stay in Peking in
1918. It is evident from this quotation that the anarchism Mao
has in mind is of a very mild sort. Richard Solomon’s statement
that “Mao himself, in student days, had toyed with the anar-
chist’s glorification of violence for its own sake” is completely
mistaken. 59 In China the content of anarchism ran the whole
gamut from men of goodwill with an animus toward hierarchy
to violent nihilists. 60 Mao’s “anarchism” favors organization for
political and social ends, but it opposes the use of violence in at-
taining them. If the question of political violence is disregarded,
it could be argued that rather than Mao later converting to
Marxism, Chinese Marxism came to Mao, since such charac-
teristically Chinese Communist tenets as mass line, internation-
alism, and benevolence to transformed reactionaries roughly
correspond to the virtues of anarchism which he enumerates in
the article. Early Chinese Communists were not hostile to anar-
chism. They applauded its rejection of existing society and its
communal ideal but considered it impractical and utopian as a
political movement. As a 1921 article put it, “the anarchists are
our friends but not our comrades.” 61
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There are, however, some significant differences between
the political viewpoint expressed in “The Great Union of the
Popular Masses” and Mao’s later Marxism. The most evident is
his reluctance to consider violent means in confronting the pow-
erholders. Instead of this means of confrontation, two methods
are proposed: the immediate one of patiently building up basic
groups and the ultimate one of the all-powerful “great shout to-
gether.” Mao’s pacifism is intimately related to the reliance on
groups rather than classes—sociability rather than unequal re-
lations—as the basic social unit. 62 The result is a cry for liber-
ation rather than a call for revolution. In this sense it could be
said that Mao’s political views in 1919 were more utopian than
anarchist, and his own description, “a curious mixture,” is most
accurate. 63
THE HUNAN SELF-GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT
With the political stimulation of the May Fourth Movement,
Mao became involved in a variety of public causes. The most
notable of his efforts were an attempt to unseat the Hunan
warlord Zhang Jingyao and a flurry of articles on the status of
women prompted by the suicide of an unwilling bride in late
1919. Mao lost the first round of his battle with Zhang when
a general student strike against the warlord led to the sup-
pression of the Xiang River Review. Mao went on his second trip
to Peking and Shanghai in order to enlist the aid of influential
Hunanese in the capital in removing Zhang. Mao’s writings on
the status of women helped stimulate a major discussion of
this question in Changsha, but only fragments of these news-
paper articles are currently available. 64 Mao’s basic point was
that traditional Chinese society had bound women in an “iron
cage” from which suicide might seem the only escape. The same
general sentiment is echoed in Mao’s position of the 1950s
that “genuine equality of the sexes can only be realized in the
process of the socialist transformation of society as a whole.” 65
Zhang Jingyao was driven out of Hunan by July 1920. Al-
though this event was due more to the vagaries of warlord
politics than to the vigorous efforts of Mao, the New Citizens
Study Society, and many other Hunanese to oust him, the sit-
uation presented an unusual opportunity for the war-ridden
province to acquire some autonomy and freedom from military
rule. In these circumstances a two-factioned movement for “Hu-
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nanese Self-Government” arose. The more conservative faction
was composed of established politicians and favored a consti-
tution written by a committee of provincial politicians and as-
sembly members. The more radical wing favored a popularly
elected constitutional assembly. Of the ten articles Mao wrote
supporting the radical self-government faction, four (and a co-
drafted proposal) have been discovered by Angus McDonald. 66
Mao’s articles have two basic concerns: the first is the pre-
condition of a successful and long-lasting self-government; the
second is the possibility and desirability of self-government for
Hunan. The basic requirement for successful self-government
is that it have a popular basis, since self-government organized
exclusively by gentry would be fundamentally misconceived.
This popular basis can be achieved by real mobilization of the
people. On the second point, Mao observes that the theory
that only big nations are strong enough to survive is an im-
perialist lie disproved by revolutions all over the world. That
autonomy would benefit Hunan is indicated by a long and im-
pressive narration of the sufferings Hunan has undergone be-
cause she was part of China. The fifth work, “A Proposal to
Convene a ‘Hunan People’s Constitutional Convention’ by the
‘Hunan Revolutionary Government’ to Enact a ‘Hunan Consti-
tution’ for the Purpose of Constructing a ‘New Hunan,’” is just
what its title implies. It was coauthored by Mao, the editor of
the Changsha Da Gong Bao, and the president of the Hunan
union of students, and was signed by 377 students, journalists,
lawyers, and others. Although it cannot be considered an article
which Mao wrote, it is a document to which he contributed.
The content of these articles can be fruitfully related to that
of the “Great Union of the Popular Masses” written the pre-
vious year. To some extent we have here a “great unionist” at
work, one not discouraged by starting small, engaging in pa-
tient work at the existing level of people’s consciousness, in-
sisting that a durable government needs a popular basis, and
finding proof of the possibility of Hunan’s self-government in
international developments and the extremity of Hunan’s suf-
fering. Angus McDonald calls such activity “more Woodrow
Wilson than Lenin,” 67 and the same scornful judgment from a
radical point of view is made seven months after Mao’s articles
in the journal Gongchandang [Communist]: “If one day the war-
lords were overthrown by the gentry (shenren) class, the gentry
class would immediately turn into the previous warlords, doing
evil of the same kind and manner, robbing the common people.”
68 Both these judgments confuse a concern for immediate ac-
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tivity with an acceptance of the politics of such a movement
as abstractly necessary and sufficient—for that matter, they are
considerably more rigid than the political tactics of Lenin or
Marx. Mao had defended the “Oust Zhang Jingyao” and “Self-
Government” movements to critical members of the New Cit-
izens Study Group:
The movement to oust Zhang was just a simple opposition to
the powerholder (qiang quan zhe) Zhang Jingyao. The self-gov-
ernment movement is just a simple aspiration that Hunan could
specially produce a method which would allow Hunan to become
a relatively good environment. Within this environment we would
like to pursue concrete preparatory work.
These two movements are both only expediencies utilizing the
present context … in order to achieve measures for basic reform.
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On the other hand the tone is significantly different from that
of his May Fourth work. Much of the energy of the May Fourth
Movement seemed to have evaporated as quickly as it arose,
and, although Mao took the long view rather than despairing,
the lessons of the movement significantly affected his political
outlook. The world and China had awakened, but persistent and
practical movements drawing their strength from the people
were replacing the political mechanism of the great shout. This
recognition of the political power of organization and concrete
programs is a natural and direct development from Mao’s em-
phasis the previous year on organizing “small unions” around
shared grievances. In his autobiography, Mao connects this re-
alization to an incident in the self-government movement:
I remember an episode in 1920, when the New Citizens Study
Society organized a demonstration to celebrate the third an-
niversary of the Russian October Revolution. It was suppressed
by the police. Some of the demonstrators had attempted to raise
the Red Flag at that meeting, but were prevented from doing so
by the police. They then pointed out that, according to Article 12
of the [then] Constitution, the people had the right to assemble,
organize, and speak, but the police were not impressed. They
replied that they were not there to be taught the Constitution, but
to carry out the orders from the governor, Zhao Hengti. From this
time on I became more and more convinced that only mass po-
litical power, secured through mass action, could guarantee the
realization of dynamic reforms. 70
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THE CULTURAL BOOK SOCIETY
The self-government movement was not the only effort Mao
made at this time to prepare Hunan for basic reforms. In 1920
Mao organized a Russian affairs study group and a work-study
scheme for students going to Russia, a Marxism study group,
a Hunan branch of the Socialist Youth Corps (one of the most
successful provincial branches), and the Cultural Book Society.
He was, moreover, director of the Primary School Section of the
First Normal School and chairman of its alumni club.
Of all these varied activities, it is most fortunate that materi-
al has been preserved on the Cultural Book Society. Whereas
the political relevance of his other activities is fairly self-ev-
ident, that Mao would operate a bookstore as a mission rather
than as a means of support seems anomalous. The available doc-
uments on the society make clear the various educational func-
tions of the enterprise.
The Cultural Book Society was a cooperative capitalized by
members’ contributions and run by an elected manager (Mao)
who was obligated to make semiannual public reports. Its main
purpose was “allowing all kinds of worthwhile recent publica-
tions to spread throughout the province, giving everyone the
opportunity to peruse them. 71 This was done by operating a
main bookstore and ordering service in Changsha and encour-
aging branches to be set up in all counties. Later plans were
announced for setting up an editing and translation bureau and
a printing department. 72 All persons contributing one yuan or
more were considered equal members; contributions did not
pay interest and could not be withdrawn; no profit was made
by the main bookstore on branch society purchases; and the
society’s accounts were available for inspection to everyone,
member or not.
These regulations already suggest some of the secondary
motivations for the society, motivations which are made explicit
in the report of April 1921 given just before Mao left for the
First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The society
was not just a bookstore trying to sell progressive books. It
considered itself a semipublic provincial organ with a mission
to make available “books of value” to everyone. Enhancing its
semipublic character was its partially successful attempt to use
county educational officials and facilities for organizing branch
book societies throughout Hunan. Moreover, it was constructed
as a model organization for Chinese social ventures: its business
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was open (contrasted to the Chinese penchant for secrecy in
business); its capital was not threatened by the possibility of
withdrawal; it was not an undertaking for individual profit (Mao
castigates the excessive individualism of Chinese merchants in
“The Great Union of the Popular Masses”); and its accounts
were orderly and efficient. This “model enterprise” reminds one
of Robert Owens’ attempt to win British merchants to humane
treatment of workers by demonstrating that his New Lanark
factory was a financial success—except that Mao tried to do
without either the primitive or the essentially capitalistic as-
pects of the entrepreneurial system. 73
So far as its fate is recorded, the Cultural Book Society
was a success. A coup was scored at its founding by getting
Tan Yankai, durable Hunanese politician and then governor of
the province, to supply his calligraphy for the signboard of
the bookstore. By the time of the semiannual report, seven
branches and seven school depots had been established and the
society had sold 160 titles (including, according to Li Rui, An
Introduction to Marx’s Capital, History of Socialism, and The
Worker’s and Peasant’s Govern ment and China), 40 different
magazines, and 3 newspapers. Perhaps Mao’s success with an
alternative enterprise encouraged him to attempt alternative
education the following year.
THE HUNAN SELF-EDUCATION COLLEGE
Mao’s last Hunan venture which did not presuppose a class
viewpoint was the founding of the Hunan Self-Education
College. Despite Han Suyin’s claim that “the whole purpose of
the college was actually the recruitment and training of cadres
for the Communist Party,” 74 the “Introductory Statement of the
Hunan Self-Education College” persuasively argues a broader
case based on a participatory concept of education which can
be traced in Mao’s earliest works. The school in its original con-
ceptualization does not seem to have been successful, however,
and Mao himself had little time for it after the first few months.
The college was conceived as a quasi-public provincial in-
stitution by its founder—and with ironic justification in that it
was indirectly supported by provincial funds. A public stipend
of four hundred yuan per month to the Quan Shan (Wang Fuzhi)
Society was diverted, legally, to the establishment and mainte-
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nance of the college. The college was dissolved in November
1923 for teaching rebellious doctrines, but in two months it
reappeared as the Xiang River Middle School.
On 16 August 1921, the “Introductory Statement of the Hu-
nan Self-Education College” was published in Changsha news-
papers in order to explain the college and attract students. The
article is a development of the theme clearly stated in the first
paragraph: “Its [the college’s] purpose lies in using the tradi-
tional academy (shuyuan) form to acquire the content of the
modern schools (xuexiao).” 75 Mao goes on to criticize the career
orientation of the traditional academies and, more interestingly,
the structural and methodological faults of modern schools.
After evaluating their respective good points, he describes their
shared “nondemocracy” (fei pingmin zhuyi): entry is restricted
by examinations and high fees, and an intellectual class (jieji)
of academicians who isolate themselves from the people is es-
tablished. 76 Finally, Mao argues, the province of Hunan needs
the college because there is no Hunan University as yet and the
Hunanese people need something to satisfy their spiritual needs
and develop their cultural desires:
Although in actuality it [the college] is unable to establish rela-
tions with every Hunanese, in spirit it must be made into a public
academic organ of the Hunanese society; although it is impossible
to say for sure that it will have very good results, if we advance
energetically for many years and months, we believe that one day
we will achieve our goals. 77
An interesting feature of this article is that although Mao
was the leader of the Hunan Communist Party by this time,
the article’s format, combining the good points of old and new
educational systems, is the most moderate stance that Mao had
taken toward existing conditions so far. The effect of the article
was more radical, however, since Mao’s trenchant critique of
the modern schools was a basic attack on a progressively dis-
posed and influential segment of the provincial elite. 78 His cri-
tique of the modern school is basically this: there is no intimate
relation between teacher and student, only uniform and me-
chanical management; moreover, the system requires passive
students and thus inhibits individual character from developing.
The second charge is directly related to Mao’s earlier criticism
of the schools in “A Study of Physical Education” and “Great
Union of the Popular Masses.” 79
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The concept of class (jieji) makes its first strong appearance
in this article, 80 but the “class of common people” is the major
focus and the proletarian class (wuchan jieji) enters as “the so-
called proletarian class.” The most interesting use of the term
is its application to academicians. They monopolize learning by
making it mysterious, thereby isolating themselves from the so-
ciety of common people and “developing the curious situation
of a kind of intellectual class (zhishi jieji) using the class of
common people as slaves.” 81 The function of the term “class”
here is to identify a group with its own interests vis-à-vis an-
other group. Class is not defined by an individual attribute
shared by all members but by a corporate behavior pattern in
which all members take part. As used here, class is thus “class
for itself” rather than “class in itself.”
Shortly after founding the Self-Education College, Mao be-
came very busy in organizing the Hunan labor movement in line
with party policy before the 7 February 1923 Incident involving
the killing of railway workers in North China. The Hunan labor
movement, spurred by the successful Anyuan Coal Mine strike
in September 1922, developed rapidly. Mao’s leadership in the
labor unrest made him a persona non grata with the governor,
who ordered his arrest. Mao fled to Shanghai in April 1923.
CONCLUSION
Throughout all of Mao’s early activities and writings the
most striking characteristic is an energetic and selfless concern
for public affairs. In his innumerable efforts to do something for
the common good, Mao is the prototype of the main target of
future CCP recruitment—the activist (jijifenzi).
Mao’s style consistently urges the reader to do something.
The moral imperatives are neither abstract nor categorical:
the discussion of the topic leads to a consideration of what to
do which implies who to do it. In every article Mao identifies
himself as one of those who see the problem and feel compelled
to act. The pronoun “we” is far more important than “I,” and its
reference group is never exclusive and usually is the people. 82
In the works discussed in this chapter, Mao’s activism is ex-
pressed in the intimate relationship between theoretical con-
cerns and practical activities. Every article contains a signif-
icant and plausible proposal for immediate action, and in most
cases Mao already had been engaged in the endeavor he sug-
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gests. His concerns are thus about matters with which he is
familiar, and he writes when he thinks successful action is pos-
sible. The question of where to begin is never left unanswered;
in fact, it is sometimes used as a critical tool against alter-
native viewpoints. 83 As Mao remarked to his fellow New Cit-
izens Study Society members:
I feel that very many people talk about reform, but for them it is
only an empty ideal. Where do they eventually want to get to with
their reforms? What methods will they use to achieve it? At what
point will they themselves or their comrades begin work?—there
is very little careful research of these problems. 84
Mao’s practical orientation has a basic influence on his the-
oretical style. Since any theory proposed is expected to be
workable in practice, Mao’s chief concern is with the cor-
rectness of the theory at hand rather than an abstract com-
parison of alternative hypotheses. Mao wants to penetrate to
the essence of the matter, using assumptions of unanimity
(“everyone knows …”) to establish his formulation of the
problem and wide-ranging examples from Chinese history and
modern nations to support factual judgments. The assumptions
of unanimity are not so much self-evident propositions as as-
sumptions necessary to the general orientation of the article.
When in the “Report of the Affairs of the Cultural Book Society”
Mao says, “Everybody understands that there is nothing more
necessary than the propagation of culture, and the efficacy of
cultural propagation should not be limited to the efficacy of a
few schools,” 85 he is not stating the obvious. However, the ar-
ticle is not directed at anyone who would have serious reser-
vations about this statement. Mao’s constant use of examples
is another sign of his practical orientation. This is especial-
ly evident in “A Study of Physical Education” and the “Hunan
Self-Government” article. In the “Great Union of the Popular
Masses,” the dialectic of oppression and liberation is grounded
in a wealth of examples from Western history. Since the Cultural
Book Society and the Self-Education College are new institu-
tions, there is little place for argument from example. But it is
interesting that a significant part of Mao’s motivation in pro-
moting these novel institutions is the exemplary function he ex-
pects them to have. The importance of examples in his thinking
adds significance to the founding of model institutions.
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In these early writings the dialectical interdependence and
flux of reality has an explicit centrality for Mao’s thinking which
begins to submerge in the Hunan self-government writings.
This shift does not represent the displacement of dialectics
by a more categorical approach. Rather, the limited, practical
tasks of his later Hunan activities required only proximate prac-
tical justifications, and still later his party activities required
only proximate ideological ones. It is not difficult to perceive
a continuity in dialectical substructure in Mao’s later writings.
When the development of his political thinking demanded a
major reorientation in approach, as in 1937 and 1956–1957,
Mao reasoned from his basic dialectical viewpoint. But the more
philosophical works expose the logical skeleton of his thinking;
they are not temporary apostasies from an otherwise dogmatic
Marxism. The anti-Marxist bias typical of Western scholarship
on Mao has contributed more to the apparent woodenness of
Mao’s writings than did Mao himself.
Ultimately, Mao’s justification for ideological commitment
is utility. Mao argues for the New Citizens Study Society to
become Marxist: “Unions of feeling (ganjing de jihe) should
become unions of ideology (zhuyi de jihe)…. Ideology is like a
banner. When the banner is raised, everyone then has some-
thing to hope for, something to run after.” 86 The acceptance
of ideology for its utility does not imply a merely tentative
commitment, because the revolutionary action which it facili-
tates is the central task. Given a crisis of ideological leadership,
however, it might be expected (particularly with hindsight) that
development of the useful aspects of ideology and revolutionary
organization would take precedence over submission to party
dogma.
The chief characteristic of Mao’s political viewpoint in these
early works is what he calls democracy (pingmin zhuyi). Al-
though the expression is used in only two works, 87 it underlies
Mao’s orientation toward the general welfare and organiza-
tional nonexclusiveness which permeate his writings and activ-
ities and explains his procedural tenets of self-determination
and openness in public and semipublic affairs. His democratic-
populist orientation is based on the conviction, expressed in his
May Fourth articles, that the united masses of the people are
the strongest political force. A corollary developed by the first
and second “Hunan Self-Government” articles is that a strong
and viable government cannot be built without eliciting popular
support:
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How can a matter in its inception, particularly when it is ex-
tremely important, be run successfully or well if there are not
many persons to engage in a movement to promote it, to inspect
it from the side and to criticize it from behind? 88
The Cultural Book Society and Hunan Self-Education College
both assume a natural legitimacy from their democratic struc-
ture and populist missions. Both express, moreover, a quasi-
governmental urge to be available to all the people within the
provincial boundaries.
Mao’s apparent shift of focus between provincialism, nation-
alism, and internationalism can be explained by changes in his
political expectations. In each case Mao turns to the largest
feasible unit. The optimistic May Fourth articles recognize no
organizational limit to the power of the masses. By 1920 Mao
did not think that mass politics could be achieved on a national
scale, and his activities assumed provincial horizons. Thus his
“provincialism” is not an enclosure of his political aspirations;
it reflects a practical judgment that only a provincial movement
could be attempted at that time. In all cases the well-being
and discretion of subunits is respected, whether they are small
unions, county assemblies, or branch book societies.
The developments in Mao’s political thought during this
period correspond to stages in Mao’s political experience. The
May Fourth Movement demonstrated to Mao that political in-
stitutions (analogous to paternal power and school authorities)
were “paper tigers” when faced with a determined movement
from below. The consequent politicization of his activities and
attitudes was disciplined by the subsiding of the movement. His
next attempt was within the framework of a political movement,
admonishing its supporters to develop a popular base for their
autonomous government. Not only were Mao’s efforts unsuc-
cessful, but the entire self-government movement soon became
a political ploy of the new warlord, Zhao Hengti. Mao’s ac-
tivities then became less directly political. His study groups
were aimed at raising the theoretical level of fellow activists;
more general endeavors like the Cultural Book Society and
Hunan Self-Education College attempted to enliven social con-
sciousness throughout the population. In the meantime Mao’s
own political standpoint was becoming more thoroughly
Marxist and he became more involved in his organizational
role in the Chinese Communist Party. From 1921 to 1923, Mao
took a leading part in organizing labor throughout Hunan. The
slaughter of railway workers in North China in the 7 February
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1923 Incident signaled a retreat in unionizing activities, and the
situation of the Communist Party in Hunan worsened. After his
forced exit from Hunan, Mao worked for the Party Central Com-
mittee in Shanghai and shortly afterward became involved in
united front work with the Kuomintang.
The significance of Mao’s pre-Marxist thought is perhaps
best epitomized by a statement in “A Study of Physical Educa-
tion”: “The will (yizhi) is definitely the forerunner of a man’s
career.” 89 Mao’s early activities and writings reflect the
establishment of his basic mentality and style, which become
enduring components of his political identity. The continuities
which are recognizable from Mao’s earliest writings are not
crystallized aspects of ideas or behavior, however; they exist in
an active dialectic with changing political environments and de-
velopments in thought and experience. The basic continuities
of Mao’s thought can be generalized as follows. First is the
continuity in form or specific patterns of thinking in spite of
discontinuity in content. Preeminent among these patterns are
attention to the immediate despite changes in “what is con-
crete” at any particular moment and the use of a dialectical
logic in ethics and social analysis. Second is the continuity
in basic assumptions in spite of discontinuity in methods. The
primary assumption that “the united masses of the people are
the strongest political force” remains the same despite basic
changes in Mao’s framework of social analysis (from group to
class) and his framework of political action (from self-organized
local associations to the Communist Party). Assumptions of the
necessity of struggle and the importance of practice also remain
the same despite transformations of their application. Finally,
there is continuity in ultimate aspiration in spite of discontinu-
ities in practical policies. Mao’s goal of a China transformed to
serve the people is ultimately behind such apparently compro-
mising or mundane affairs as running a bookstore.
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2 Mao, the Party, and the
National Revolution:
1923–1927
The demarcation between Mao’s democratic-populist activities
and his commitment to the politics of the national revolution
is the collapse of Mao’s hope for Hunanese revolution. This
change in orientation was not abrupt: as political conditions in
Hunan restricted Mao’s popular activities to cultural and ed-
ucational ventures, his political enthusiasm came to be chan-
neled into the politics of the working class and the Chinese
Communist Party. But the final abandonment of a populist po-
litical style and of Hunan as an adequate revolutionary arena
in 1923 is nevertheless a watershed of great importance for
Mao’s political development. Mao’s next three years of CCP ac-
tivities marked an irrevocable commitment to a new framework
of politics. His concern with the peasant movement from 1925
to 1926 returned him to a direct concern with the problems
of mass revolution, but despite serious tensions with the CCP
leadership, his peasant-oriented populist empiricism remained
within the Leninist party paradigm.
The consequences of the loss of Mao’s native political base
for his politics can be seen in a short piece Mao wrote just
before leaving Changsha for Shanghai, “An Introduction to New
Age.” The return to broader political horizons—“how the nation
is to be recast, how politics is to be cleaned up, how imperialism
is to be defeated, how military rule is to be overthrown, how
the educational system is to be reformed, how literature, art
and other fields are to be revolutionized and reconstructed”—is
not due to a resurgence of May Fourth confidence in the im-
mediacy of revolution. It results from the conviction, painfully
acquired, that a democratic revolution within one province was
impossible. And it indicates a change in political focus from
the masses of the people to a group of colleagues with “an in-
dependent and self-strengthening spirit, a persevering and un-
bending will.” This “state of scholarly refugees” (xuewen shang
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di wangming zhi bang—referring to the new periodical and its
sponsors) does not have the natural legitimacy or ultimate po-
litical power of the masses; it is the auxiliary to future mass pol-
itics. 1 Its role lies precisely in the general unpreparedness of
society for revolution. Its function is to “study the practically
useful disciplines and carry out preparations for the reform
of the society” and to be “an experimental standard.” Some
success in these tasks can be expected because of the spiritu-
al qualities of the group: “Starting with such a purpose (zixin
feichang zhengque), and proceeding with such spirit and will,
it necessarily has hope for success.” Although the colleagues
of whom this was written were involved with the periodical
New Age and the Self-Educational College, the description is
also quite appropriate for the Chinese Communist Party. The
article’s emphasis on theory—or, more precisely, on correct
knowledge by which a dedicated group will pave the way for
mass political activity—indicates a motif which runs throughout
this period of Mao’s politics and writings.
This chapter is concerned with the ideological aspect of
Mao’s development from 1923 to 1927 because ideology figures
more prominently in Mao’s thought after his commitment to
communism. The conceptual framework of class struggle, the
proletarian party, imperialism, learning from the Russian expe-
rience—all took the place of Mao’s more global speculations of
the May Fourth era on “how man should live” and the nature
of political power. Although the values of Mao’s pre-Marxist
politics remained, the process of developing from the “good
activist” into the “good cadre” involved basic political and in-
tellectual adaptations. When the optimism of the May Fourth
Movement proved unfounded, the focus of Mao’s politics shifted
from the metamorphosing instant of anarchist revolution and
its ephemeral midwife, the great shout of the people, to more
limited and feasible projects. The earlier expectation of a di-
mensionless moment of transformation required neither a revo-
lutionary organization nor a strategy; the mission was a simple
one of popular enlightenment-spreading the good news of the
power of the aroused masses. With the dampening of hopes for
a quick and painless transfer of power, popular revolution came
to be regarded as the end product of a necessary process of rev-
olutionary activity. A protracted struggle was now felt to be in-
evitable, one involving limited objectives and cumulative gains
in a prerevolutionary environment.
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The new significance of strategic ideology and political or-
ganization is based directly on the addition of the dimension of
time to the revolutionary enterprise. With this realization, Mao
entered the Leninist framework of a disciplined party guided
by a scientific revolutionary strategy. Mao did not add his own
characteristic dimension of revolutionary activity, that of space,
until the defensive situation of the base areas after 1927 and
the sustaining potential of the peasantry required it. From 1923
to 1927, Mao’s politics and thinking were shaped within the
Leninist paradigm of the ideological party creating and awaiting
the revolutionary opportunity.
The innovations in Mao’s political thought in the period
under consideration in this chapter are thus primarily inno-
vations of ideology and organization. The first major change
is the transitional one of Mao’s development into the party
framework of activity. Since this was a complex and drawn-
out process, let us highlight some themes of Mao’s politics
not stressed in Chapter 1. Mao’s first contribution within the
Leninist framework was his theory of party alliances. Mao’s po-
sition on alliances was quite flexible, but it did provide some
underlying principles for the hectic politics of the national rev-
olution and the Northern Expedition, and eventually it became
an essential part of the logic of united fronts. Mao’s most sig-
nificant contribution to the politics of the Leninist revolutionary
party combined the question of rural revolution with that of the
party’s legitimacy. In the welling optimism and opportunities of
the 1926 Northern Expedition, Mao’s basic political values sur-
faced in his emphasis on the potential for popular revolution
(necessarily including the peasantry) rather than on the chance
for a merely partisan success. Confronted with the possibility
of revolutionary breakthrough, the revolutionary organization
(or at least the really revolutionary organization) must serve
its purpose rather than simply serve itself. Mao’s commitment
to a political approach of populist empiricism rather than to
the urban orientation of the Central Committee of the CCP put
him in a serious conflict with party leadership which was only
partially resolved by the collapse of CCP-Kuomintang cooper-
ation in 1927. As Mao fought for survival in his remote bases
after 1927, the challenge to revolutionary legitimacy which he
saw in the peasant movement of 1926–1927 developed into a
new rural political-military strategy.
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